August 2008Going to WarBy David MatsudaThe road to nation building has long been paved with good intentions gone awry. Sadly, Iraq is no exception to this historical trend. When Coalition Forces (CF) arrived in Iraq they funneled billions of dollars to “fake sheikhs” who didn’t deliver on promised reconstruction goals, and, because they weren’t legitimate tribal leaders, couldn’t be held accountable. During my first five months in Iraq I set about to determine what the difference was between a fake and a real sheikh. After interviewing dozens of sheikhs and other traditional leaders, I identified the three essential qualities of a real sheikh: honor, power, and influence. For the next five months I attempted to convince CF to remove fake sheikhs from the money stream, and to get the real sheikhs contracts for rebuilding Iraq. What follows is an edited version of a paper I authored that convinced CF to weed-out fake sheikhs and to engage real sheikhs in rebuilding Iraq’s social, economic and the political fabric.
The Alpha Male in Iraq: How to Identify Legitimate Tribal Authority The old man sits alone in the corner. As his tribe’s paramount sheikh, he should, by American standards, be the center of attention. After all, the guests and relatives are eating his food, enjoying his garden, and chatting with each other while sitting on his furniture. Yet, the sheikh sits quietly alone as he watches his sons and young male relatives engage with CF. Tribal custom dictates that anyone who wants to do business with his qabila (tribal confederation) must first meet with subordinate sub-sheiks from his ashiras (tribal organizations). The sheikh sits patiently, watching the young men of his tribe speaking English, acting as tribal ambassadors, and negotiating with CF. He fidgets uneasily as the exchange of enormous sums of money is discussed, deals are made and contracts promised. A proud man, he’s taken aback when the younger men, who dress in traditional clothing only when they are with Americans, agree to further meetings with CF at their own homes, where they sign contracts on the tribes’ behalf without consulting him first. His authority by consensus, handed down to him through past generations of leaders, has been compromised and undercut. His anger is twofold. First, he’s angry with CF, who he believes has taken advantage of his younger, inexperienced tribal diplomats and signed contracts that humiliated them in both his eyes and the eyes of his tribesmen. The Americans don’t know and seemingly don’t care about tribal customs and leadership. A proud man, he will no longer seek out these crude outsiders, nor will he allow them to do any business with his tribe. Second, he is angry with his young sons and male relatives, who know that they should serve the tribal whole, but instead make deals that enrich only themselves. When the sheikh exercises his authority and threatens one of his unruly subordinates, the young pretender shames himself by sending CF to threaten him. Angered further, the sheikh, as is his right, seeks a consensus vote by the majles al shuyukh, or sheikhs council, and restores his tribe’s honor by banishing, or, in extreme cases, killing the usurper. CF respond by searching the sheikh’s house, traumatizing his family, breaking belongings, and briefly detaining him. These Americans, he now believes, are no longer welcome guests, but, like so many past occupiers, ignorant heathens who don’t understand nobility and honor. The sheikh uses his wasta (influence) to disown his son and male relatives, and forbids his loyal fellow tribesmen from any business contact with the Americans. Meanwhile, the younger males enrich themselves with contract after contract. When CF begin to question the poor quality of the work, the pretenders, bound not by honor, but opportunism, answer that their services go to the highest bidder: CF or al Qae’da, it doesn’t matter to them. As promised deliverables never materialize and relations between CF and these “fake sheikhs” become more problematic, the paramount sheikh, the true alpha male in Iraqi society, continues to work for the good of his tribe. He’s not as rich as he could be if he worked with the Americans, but his tribe’s honor remains intact. Texas Street resident David Matsuda, PhD spent roughly one year in Iraq advising CF on how to improve cultural interactions.
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